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I n	 the	 20
th	 century,	 railroad	 lines	 became	 famous	 for	 highly	
efficient,	 progressive	 and	 dependable	 travel—or	 for	 dramatic	
accidents,	which	 epitomized	 the	height	 of	negligence	 and	bad	
planning.	Whether	 these	 railroad	events	are	agonizing	or	amazing,	

















seems	 to	 be	 a	 universal	 goal,	 it	 is	 becoming	 evident	 that	 it	 is	 an	






The Mine Action Express… 
or the Wreck of the ‘09
Effective	national	ownership	im-
plies	 a	 string	 of	 interrelated	 condi-
tions.	 It	 suggests	 a	 strong	 national	
will;	 an	 integrated	 set	 of	 govern-
ment	 agencies;	 the	 ability	 to	 recog-
nize,	build	and	maintain	capacities;	
and	 a	 skill	 and	 willingness	 to	 en-
gage	 the	 populace.	 These	 charac-
teristics	 have	 proven	 difficult	 for	
countries	 emerging	 from	 crisis	 situ-






help	 these	 countries.	But	 the	 concept	 of	 building	national	 inde-
pendence	from	without—that	is,	by	external	forces—is	touchy	at	
best.	National	ownership	implies	sovereignty	and	independence;	
yet	 foreign	 technical	 advisors,	 donor	 representatives,	 U.N.	 field	
workers,	 guest	 militaries	 and	 diplomats	 are	 often	 inserted	 into	
the	process,	 sometimes	 ironically	 clouding	 the	 issue	 of	 national	
independence	even	while	striving	mightily	to	help	develop	strong	
national	capabilities.
The	above	 situation	 is	 the	best-case	 scenario.	Reports	at	both	
the	most	recent	International	Meeting	of	Mine	Action	Programme	
Directors	 and	 U.N.	 Advisors	 in	 July	 and	 Ottawa	 Convention	
States	Parties	Meeting	in	September	suggest	a	significant	number	
of	 impacted	 governments	 are	 just	 “not	 there”	 when	 it	 comes	 to	
The author discusses current challenges relating to an effective global mine-
action strategy; he considers approaches and policies that could enhance 
or impede demining efforts worldwide. There are many emerging concepts 
to consider in order to improve mine action, such as mainstreaming, risk 
management and national ownership. The author discusses potential future 
plans of action the community must undertake regarding these issues in 













dividual	 tragedies	 of	 landmine	 acci-
dents,	while	emotionally	compelling,	
pale	 in	 numerical	 comparison	 to	
other	 threats	 (AIDS,	 malnutrition,	
factional	 violence,	 motor	 vehicle	




should	 be	 given	 priority	 consider-
ation	 among	 other	 national	 pro-
grams,	to	the	extent	that	it	supports	
socioeconomic	 development.	 Ah,	
but	 the	 rub	 comes	 when	 trying	 to	
disengage	 the	 highly	 successful	
mine-action	 juggernaut,	which	has	




a	 worldwide	 public	 following,	 and	
fit	 it	 into	 a	 larger	 and	 less	 discrete	
development	program.	Many	in	the	
mine-action	 community	 are	 afraid	
to	 turn	 the	 throttle	 over	 to	 devel-
opment	 officials	 and	 move	 toward	
the	back	of	the	train,	out	of	sight	of	
the	engine,	gauges	and	view	ahead.	
Their	 motives	 may	 range	 from	 the	
altruistic	 to	 the	 purely	 selfish,	 but	
their	concerns	are	real	nevertheless.	
Development	 plans	 and	 officials	
are	 not	 always	 enamored	 with	 or	
cognizant	of	the	complexities	of	mine	action,	nor	are	donors	neces-
sarily	 eager	 to	 pledge	 funds	 to	 support	 activities	 other	 than	 those	
specifically	earmarked	for	mine-action	projects.	It	remains	for	those	
in	the	global	community	to	foster	vehicles	such	as	the	Millennium	
Development	Goals²	 to	provide	 settings	 that	will	promote	an	envi-
ronment	of	trust	and	comfort	in	which	mine-action	activities	can	be	
integrated	with	other	projects	and	programs.
Landmines and Other Explosive Remnants of War³
To	achieve	any	end,	we	must	first	determine	what	is	impeding	our	










have	had	 to	deal	 realistically	with	 all	potential	 explosive	 remnants	
of	war.	The	landmine	strategy	has	been	successful,	but	it	still	needs	
to	address	the	question	of	the	growing	threat	of	other	ERW.
Some,	 such	 as	 Tim	 Carstairs	 of	 Mines	 Advisory	 Group,	 argue	
that	 the	 mixed	 weapon	 consideration	 must	 be	 taken	 into	 account	
and	that	donors	and	policy	makers	must	be	made	to	understand	the	
concept	 that	 landmines,	 small	arms	and	 light	weapons,	UXO,	etc.,	
must	 be	 considered	 and	 planned	 together	 in	 order	 to	 assure	 that	
the	land	is	indeed	safe	and	preparation	for	subsequent	development	
is	assured.
The	 good	 news	 is	 that	 many	 organizations,	 such	 as	 the	
European	 Commission,	 the	 	 U.N.	 	 Mine	 Action	 Service	 and	 the	
Geneva	 International	 Centre	 for	 Humanitarian	 Demining	 have	
taken	the	pragmatic	step	of	including	broader	ERW	considerations	
into	 mandates	 to	 support	 mine	 action,	 and	 some	 countries	 such	
as	 Cambodia	 have	 adopted	 a	 holistic	 approach	 to	 post-conflict	








APLs.	 Based	 on	 these	 surveys,	 suspected	 mined	 areas	 were	 identi-
fied.	 Predictably,	 in	 an	 effort	 not	 to	 pass	 over	 contaminated	 areas,	
many	more	suspected	mine	areas	were	identified	than	in	reality	were	
seeded	 with	 mines.	 It	 now	 appears	 that	 upwards	 of	 90	 percent	 of	
operators’	 time	 and	 resources	 are	 being	 spent	 in	 areas	where	 there	
are	no	mines.6	
It	 will	 require	 imagination	 and	 courage	 to	 deal	 with	 this	 situa-
tion,	but	the	cold,	hard	fact	is	massive	quantities	of	usable	land	are	
declared	out	of	bounds,	which	is	a	major	factor	keeping	developing	
countries	 from	 expanding	 education,	 trade,	 agriculture	 and	 other	
development.	 Per	 Nergaard	 of	 Norwegian	 People’s	 Aid	 suggests	
identifying	 and	 releasing	 the	 wrongly	 identified	 land	 will	 require	
considering	such	 ideas	as	 tolerable	 risk,	 implementing	new	and	 im-
proved	techniques	of	information	gathering	and	management,	and	re-	
classifying	 land	 under	 review,	 immediately	 placing	 land	 declared	
“released”	 from	 threat	 into	 productive	 use.	 Nergaard	 recommends	
greater	use	of	technical	research	and	geographic	information	systems	
polygon-control	measures	 to	 take	 some	of	 the	guesswork	out	of	 re-
lease.	He	accepts	the	fact	that	liability,	risk	and	standards	will	come	
into	play	but	insists	these	are	concepts	that	simply	have	to	be	faced.	
Others	will	not	 accept	 such	 an	 interpretation	because	 they	believe	









railroad	 journey	 is	fixing	 a	definite	 schedule	 and	 timetable.	While	
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mine-action	managers	find	themselves	faced	
with	 today.	 In	 the	 simplest	 of	 all	 strategy	
formulas,	we	ask	“Where	are	we?	Where	do	
we	want	to	go?	How	do	we	get	there?”	If	we	
do	 not	 know	 where	 we	 want	 to	 go,	 no	 ef-
fective	strategy	can	be	planned,	and	we	will	
surely	never	reach	our	goal.
There	 are	 various	 guideposts	 for	
global	 mine	 action,	 but	 none	 so	 univer-
sally	 applied	 as	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	
Ottawa	 Convention.	 Article	 5	 (Clearance)	
of	 that	 document	 appears	 to	 be	 unam-
biguous:	 “Each	 State	 Party	 undertakes	 to	
destroy	or	ensure	the	destruction	of	all	anti-	
personnel	 mines.”4	 Thus	 the	 Convention	
seems	 to	 call	 for	 what	 some	 (such	 as	 the	
Landmine Monitor)	 define	 as	 a	 “mine	 free”	
world.	 And	 yet	 the	 very	 first	 words	 of	 the	
Convention	 imply	 that	 the	 reason	 for	 the	
formal	agreement	 is	 that	 the	States	Parties	
are	“Determined	to	put	an	end	to	the	suffer-
ing	 and	 casualties.”4	 This	 suggests	 the	 rea-




United	 Nations	 Development	 Programme	
points	out	that	neither	term—mine-free	nor	
impact-free—is	found	in	the	Convention.
Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 not	 difficult	 to	 find	
champions	for	each	point	of	view.	Richard	
Kidd	of	 the	U.S.	Department	of	State	pro-
vides	 a	 sharp	 and	 succinct	 explanation	 of	
why	 he	 believes	 that	 a	 “mine	 free”	 global	
endstate	is	impractical:	“No	donor,	lending	
institution	and	no	major	impacted	country	









the	 lingering	 threat	 and	 impact	 of	 land-
mines.”8	It	has	therefore	articulated	a	“zero-
victim	target.”	In	a	situation	in	which	many	
nations	 at	 risk	 receive	 support	 and	 advice	
from	many	different	quarters,	they	are	often	
given	conflicting	or	nebulous	guidance.
What	 is	 clear	 is	 that	 the	 differences	
among	the	approaches	will	be	vast.	Clearing	
all	 landmines	 from	 all	 affected	 countries	
by	 2009	 or	 2010	 will	 not	 only	 be	 daunt-
ing	but	resource-intensive.	Just	as	in	curing	
any	 social	 ill	 (pollution,	 extreme	 poverty,	
HIV/AIDS,	 malnutrition,	 unemployment,	
etc.),	 erasing	 the	 very	 last	 vestiges	 of	 the	
threat	often	requires	the	largest	application	
of	resources.	This	comes	at	a	time	when	there	
are	 indications	 that	donor	 funding	will	 be-
come	more	difficult	to	obtain.	Alistair	Craib	







5	 may	 be	 unrealistic.	 If	 Belgium	 is	 not	
ready	to	declare	 itself	 free	of	all	 landmines,	
how	 can	 we	 expect	 that	 Laos,	 Cambodia,	
Mozambique	and	the	many	other	impacted	
countries	 will	 be	 able	 to	 do	 so	 within	 the	
specified	time	period?	


















































because	 they	 find	 themselves	 near	 military	 targets	 during	 air	 strikes,	
and	later	because	of	the	potentially	huge	and	unfortunate	ERW	risks	
that	will	be	difficult	to	overcome	following	the	conflict.	











ened	 the	need	 for	minefields	 as	 a	 solution	against	 armoured	attacks.	
For	 instance,	 during	World	War	 II	 the	 Italian,	 British	 and	 German	













tleground	has	changed.	 Increasingly	 sophisticated	weaponry,	 such	as	
the	Patriot	missile,4	and	other	means	of	aerial	attack	and	defence	were	
used	in	the	first	Gulf	War	and	since	to	gain	a	strategic	advantage.	The	
resulting	destruction	from	these	tactics	 is	 systematic,	 leading	to	mas-
sive	collateral	damage	on	the	ground.	
The	 tactics	 of	 modern	 warfare	 have	 continued	 to	 involve	 more	















In this article, the author looks at the rise of landmines 
and ERW1 as military tactics from the First World War 
to current conflicts. The safety risk their presence 
poses and various measures to protect civilians are 
also discussed.










prevent	 casualties	 in	 the	 areas	 that	 remain	
contaminated.”	Keeley	 implores	us	 to	have	
the	 courage	 to	 face	 this	 issue	head	on	and	
modify	Article	5	of	the	Ottawa	Convention.	
Whither the Mine-Action Express?
Never	before	in	the	short	history	of	mine	
action	 have	 there	 been	 so	 many	 emerging	
ideas	 and	 opportunities	 for	 improvements	
and	enhancements	to	mine	action.	But	nei-
ther	 have	 there	 been	 so	 many	 distractions	
and	 competing	 ideas.	 There	 is	 no	 authori-
tative	monolith	to	make	these	decisions	for	
us.	 Just	 as	 we	 have	 had	 to	 build	 mine	 ac-
tion	 through	 coordinated	 and	 sometimes	
informal	actions	in	the	past,	we	will	have	to	
achieve	 consensus	 in	 the	 future.	 Selecting,	
combining,	 designing	 and	 engineering	 the	
way	 ahead	 will	 be	 difficult—and	 probably	
painful.	 The	 goal	 is	 to	 stay	 calm,	 stay	 fo-




See Endnotes, page 109
The	 methods	 used	 in	 warfare	 have	 changed	 over	 the	 years,	
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